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Abstract 
Using a sample of 195 unique real estate investment trusts (REITs), we examine factors related to the adoption 
of clawback provisions within managerial compensation contracts. In general, we find strong and consistent 
empirical evidence that clawback provision are directly related to firm size, complexity, leverage, growth 
options, monitoring incentives, and CEO performance incentives. We also find that clawbacks are associated 
with enhanced market and accounting performance, with stronger performance relations observed for adoption 
decisions tied directly to regulatory mandates. In sum, we conclude compensation clawback provisions 
represent a value-relevant, strategic governance mechanism for REITs. 
Introduction 
During the 1990s, a string of high-profile accounting scandals brought renewed attention to the potential agency 
conflicts corporate managers face with respect to disclosing a firm's true financial position. This conflict arises 
because investors are primarily concerned with long-run wealth maximization, whereas managers frequently 
focus on short-term performance (Shleifer and Vishny [ 38] ). This misalignment is often exacerbated by 
performance incentives included in managerial compensation contracts. To the extent managers engage in 
nefarious business or accounting practices to meet short-run performance benchmarks, seemingly well-
intentioned compensation plans may actually be self-defeating.[ 1] 
One contracting mechanism designed to mitigate the short-term focus of managers is the compensation 
clawback provision. Such provisions allow the firm, or a related third party, to recapture a portion of executive 
compensation in the event ethical misconduct (such as financial misrepresentation, which results in the 
restatement of company financials) is subsequently discovered. Although such provisions have technically been 
around for decades, if not centuries, their widespread use and adoption in U.S. financial markets is a relatively 
recent phenomenon.[2] Notably, Equilar ([ 23] ) reports that the adoption of clawback provisions among Fortune 
100 firms has grown from less than 20% of firms in 2006 to over 80% of firms by year-end 2010. 
This dramatic growth in the use of clawbacks is driven, in large part, by two major pieces of recent financial 
legislation that contain explicit provisions regarding the use of clawbacks. First, Section 304 of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) stipulates that both the chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) 
of issuing firms are subject to clawbacks of both equity- and incentive-based compensation, as well as trading 
profits, in the event of financial restatements resulting from misconduct and material noncompliance with 
existing securities laws. Second, Section 954 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank) dramatically expands the scope of such clawbacks by extending the number of 
executives subject to clawbacks from simply the CEO and CFO to all current and former executive officers. It also 
expands the relevant time frame for recapturing “erroneously awarded compensation” from 12 months (under 
SOX) to 36 months. Additionally, unlike the widely criticized SOX Section 304 provisions, which lack an 
unambiguous enforcement mechanism, Dodd–Frank Section 954 clearly stipulates that firms failing to adopt or 
comply with such clawback or recapture provisions will be prohibited from listing their shares on any national 
securities exchange.[ 3] As such, the majority of publicly traded firms have a direct financial incentive to comply 
with these mandates. 
Furthermore, these incentives would appear to be particularly strong for real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
and the markets in which they raise capital. Specifically, REITs are subject to unique regulations that limit their 
ability to retain earnings while ensuring disperse ownership. Unique regulations combined with an operating 
environment in which firms regularly employ substantial leverage, exhibit entrenched managerial teams, and 
pursue large-scale, irreversible investment projects suggests that the credibility of firm disclosures would be of 
unique and utmost importance within this market sector. 
Given the potential importance of these new regulations to both executive compensation and firm disclosure 
policies, the purpose of the current article is to examine: ( 1) what factors lead to the adoption of a clawback 
provision and ( 2) how the market responds to the presence of a clawback provision. In line with the 
aforementioned arguments highlighting the importance of such provisions within REIT markets, we conduct our 
analyses within this industry. 
Previewing our results, we find clawback provisions are more common among larger and more complex firms, as 
well as among those with enhanced growth prospects, increased leverage, lower cash flows, enhanced 
monitoring incentives, and where more of the CEO's compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, we 
find mixed results with respect to corporate-governance-related firm attributes. Of note, firms with relatively 
weak boards, that is, larger boards and staggered boards, are more likely to adopt clawback provisions. Firms 
where management appears more entrenched, that is, CEO duality or incorporation in Maryland, which is 
known to be both “management friendly” and a common location for REIT incorporation filings, are less likely to 
adopt a clawback provision. Although the link between governance and clawback adoption is mixed, we do find 
evidence that the presence of a clawback is associated with enhanced market and accounting performance. 
Moreover, this association is concentrated among firms that adopt clawbacks that simply recognize the firm's 
abilities to recoup compensation under the new regulations and those that have adopted a clawback relatively 
recently (i.e., post-2006). 
Literature Review 
Within the contracting literature, clawback provisions are viewed as a mechanism for aligning managerial 
incentives with shareholder interests, as clawbacks provide the ability to mitigate the potential gains from short-
term manipulations. However, until very recently the academic literature has given only scant attention to the 
determinants, implications, and effectiveness of clawbacks. Following the regulatory mandates resulting from 
SOX and Dodd–Frank, this is beginning to change. Of note, Addy, Chu, and Yoder ([ 1] ) provide one of the 
earliest empirical investigations into the determinants of clawback adoptions. Examining S&P 500 firms between 
2006 and 2008, they find less than 30% of firms studied employ such provisions.[ 4] They also report clawback 
adoptions are directly related to both recent accounting restatements by the firm and the presence of more 
independent monitoring, but inversely related to measures of managerial influence over board decisions. 
Building on this foundation, Addy and Yoder ([ 2] ) argue compensation clawbacks are more likely to be 
observed among firms with recent financial restatements and/or weak internal governance control mechanisms. 
Moreover, they argue that such provisions should be less commonly observed among firms with relatively 
strong top management. Additional evidence on the determinants of clawback adoption is provided by Brown, 
Davis-Friday, and Guler (2011). They also examine S&P 500 firms and again find that clawback adoptions are 
related to both a firm's observable operating characteristics and corporate governance environment. 
Specifically, they conclude clawback adoption is inversely related to CEO tenure and positively related to firm 
size, board size, recent goodwill impairment, equity issuance, and in some model specifications the ratio of 
bonus to cash compensation for the firm's CEO. 
In perhaps the most detailed analysis of clawback provisions, Babenko et al. ([ 4] ) collect information on the 
presence and characteristics of clawback provisions among S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2012. They first 
document the marked increase in the use of such provisions over the past decade, from less than 1% of S&P 
1500 firms in 2000 to nearly 50% of S&P 1500 firms by the end of the sample period.[ 5] The authors then 
proceed to outline and formally document the characteristics most frequently contained within these policies, 
and provide empirical evidence that compensation clawback provision adoptions are more likely ( 1) in the 
presence of prior financial malfeasance by the organization, ( 2) when potential malfeasance is harder to detect, 
and ( 3) when managers have compensation-based incentives that potentially reward misreporting. The authors 
also find clawback adoptions are associated with both increased compensation and increased equity-based 
compensation for the firm's managers. Finally, on an ex post basis, firms adopting clawbacks are found to reduce 
overall firm risk, increase cash holdings, and decrease R&D expenditures. 
Continuing, Chan et al. ([ 13] ) employ a sample of Russell 3000 nonfinancial firms from 2000 to 2009 and 
conclude that allowing firms to recoup erroneously awarded compensation from managers enhances earnings 
quality and reduces audit risk. DeHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin ([ 21] ) provide related evidence that the presence of 
a voluntarily adopted clawback provision improves both the actual and perceived quality of a firm's financial 
disclosures.[ 6] In a similar study, Pyzoha ([ 37] ) examines the link between clawback adoption and the observed 
reduction in restatements. He reports that in the presence of a lower (higher) quality auditor, executives are less 
(more) likely to amend prior financial statements, especially when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive 
based. These results are all in line with the predictions and arguments in support of Dodd–Frank with respect to 
improvements in financial reporting.[7] 
In contrast, Davis-Friday, Fried, and Jenkins ([ 19] ) provide somewhat conflicting evidence. Although they find 
the market reaction to earnings surprises for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) firms increases after the 
adoption of (nonvoluntary) clawbacks, for non-TARP (voluntary adopter) firms, this relation does not hold.[ 8] In 
fact, the authors document a significant decline in the market's response to earnings surprises at non-TARP 
firms that voluntarily adopt clawback provisions. Along this same line of reasoning, Chen, Greene, and Owers 
([ 15] ) report that although clawbacks decrease managerial incentives to misreport, and thus are associated 
with enhanced reporting quality, making executive compensation subject to recoupment also increases the risks 
undertaken by firm managers. This increased risk could undermine the purpose of such initiatives and, at a 
minimum, should be associated with increased required compensation levels to offset the higher risks borne by 
managers. Thus, Davis-Friday, Fried, and Jenkins conclude clawback provisions offer both potential costs and 
benefits that must be jointly analyzed in determining whether the adoption of such provisions will enhance 
overall firm performance. Similar results are reported by both Chan, Chen, and Chen ([12] ) and Chan et al. ([ 14] 
), who find that although clawback provisions offer potential advantages in terms of reducing accruals-based 
accounting manipulation, they may engender the unintended consequence of real transactions management. 
Furthermore, the authors contend this phenomena is likely to be particularly prevalent for firms with strong 
incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets, such as those with high growth prospects. 
Although the studies mentioned above suggest the existence of competing costs and benefits associated with 
clawback adoption, Gao, Iskandar-Daata, and Jia ([ 29] ) find positive wealth effects accruing to shareholders of 
firms that adopt clawback provisions. As such, although the existing literature recognizes both the potential 
costs and benefits of clawback adoption, the marketplace appears to welcome such provisions within executive 
compensation contracts. 
Empirical Hypothesis Development 
As alluded to throughout the above discussion, clawback adoption has been shown to be related to a variety of 
firm-level attributes, characteristics, and activities. In this article, we explicitly investigate whether clawback 
adoption is related to: ( 1) organizational characteristics, ( 2) external monitoring, ( 3) compensation 
characteristics, and ( 4) governance mechanisms. 
First, the characteristics of an individual organization, including its complexity, performance, and relationships 
with creditors, are all likely to influence clawback adoption. For example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen ([16] ) posit 
that as complexity increases, investors will find it harder to effectively monitor managerial actions. As a result, 
stockholders of larger and more complex firms will have an economic incentive to proactively embrace 
contractual elements (e.g., clawbacks), which align managerial incentives with those of the firm owners. As such, 
throughout our empirical specifications that follow, we employ firm size (measured as the natural log of Total 
Assets) as one key measure of firm complexity. Measures of additional firm-specific attributes directly related to 
increased organizational complexity and valuation difficulty, including a firm's growth prospects, financial 
leverage, and prior market performance and volatility, are also included throughout our empirical models. Each 
measure is expected to exhibit a positive relation with the firm's propensity to employ a compensation clawback 
provision. Conversely, firms that are generating relatively large cash flows, and/or undertaking large capital 
investment expenditures involving real, tangible assets, may be more financially transparent and have less need 
to buttress the credibility of their disclosures with clawback provisions.[ 9] 
The unique regulatory and operating environment of REITs highlights the potential importance of controlling for 
firm characteristics. For example, REITs are required to distribute 90% of their taxable income to shareholders in 
the form of dividends to retain their tax-advantaged status. As a result, it often becomes difficult (if not 
impossible) for firms within this industry to retain sufficient internally generated cash flows to fund their desired 
expansion and acquisition activities. Growth firms, in turn, are thus forced to become frequent issuers in the 
capital market. As such, we expect growth options (Tobin's Q) to be a uniquely important determinant of 
clawback adoptions within REIT markets. Similarly, Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007), Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu 
([ 9] ), and Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler ([ 33] ) all document the extensive use of debt within REIT capital 
structures. Given the aforementioned internal capital constraints, we would thus also expect debt usage 
(Leverage) to be strongly associated with clawback adoption. 
Finally, with regard to creditor relationships, firms with a history of financial obfuscation and/or malfeasance, as 
evidenced by recently restated financial statements, may benefit from enhancing the credibility of their financial 
disclosures. Danielsen et al. ([ 17] , [ 18] ) find REITs that increase the transparency of their financial market 
disclosures are rewarded with reduced transactions costs and capital acquisition costs in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, with respect to the current investigation, they document that REITs exhibit a high proclivity to 
restate earnings or assets for reasons other than methodological or accounting rules changes, with 50% of their 
sample firms undertaking such actions. As such, we postulate restatements may be a uniquely important 
determinant of clawback adoptions within REIT markets. Similarly, firms with investment-grade debt 
outstanding have already subjected themselves to relatively intense market scrutiny and thus may have 
relatively little to gain from additional certification along this dimension. Thus, we anticipate clawback adoptions 
will be positively associated with recent financial restatements and negatively associated with the presence of 
investment-grade debt within the firm's capital structure. More formally, these expected relations between firm 
characteristics and clawback adoption may be summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (Firm Characteristics) The propensity of a firm to adopt a clawback provision is directly 
related to contemporaneous firm complexity and inversely related to both the tangibility of 
existing cash flows and investment opportunities, as well as the perceived credibility of the 
firm's financial disclosures. 
 
Second, we view the relation between clawback adoption and external monitoring as an open empirical 
question. If the presence of external monitors reduces a manager's ability to engage in the type of short-term 
financial manipulation that is likely to trigger a clawback provision, the benefit of a clawback is reduced, 
potentially making clawback adoption less likely. Conversely, the presence of external monitors may increase 
the effectiveness of a clawback provision, as they are potentially more likely to detect and prosecute financial 
misconduct, thereby making firms more likely to adopt a clawback provision. Thus, we view the effect of 
monitoring as an open empirical question. With respect to the current investigation, we measure monitoring by 
the presence of active financial analysts, the proportion of total shares held by institutional investors, and the 
proportion of total shares held by blockholders (entities with at least a 5% ownership stake in the firm).[ 10] We 
also note that REIT markets are subject to disperse ownership regulations under which the top five (i.e., largest) 
shareholders are prohibited from owning more than 50% of the firm's outstanding shares. As a result, it is 
possible that monitoring effects along the ownership dimension (both Institutional Ownership and 
Blockholdings) may be muted. Formalizing these expected relations: 
Hypothesis 2 (Monitoring/Oversight) The propensity of a firm to adopt a clawback provision is 
significantly related to the degree of external monitoring/oversight of the firm. 
 
Third, a firm's compensation policies may materially affect clawback adoption proclivities. As noted above, Chen, 
Greene, and Owers ([ 15] ) and Babenko et al. ([ 4] ) report that firms with clawback provisions are characterized 
by both higher levels of executive compensation and more incentive-based compensation.[ 11] Additionally, 
Brink and Rankin ([ 10] ) contend that because of loss aversion and endowment effects, employees dislike 
“penalty” provisions within their compensation contracts. Thus, as clawback provisions are designed to 
recapture incentive-based income and performance bonuses, to maintain constant levels of managerial utility 
such provisions within executive compensation contracts must be offset by higher total compensation levels. To 
the extent these findings are generalizable to REIT firms, we anticipate a positive association between clawback 
adoptions and both total and (equity) incentive-based compensation. More formally: 
Hypothesis 3 (Compensation) The propensity of a firm to adopt a clawback provision is positively related 
to both executive compensation levels and the percentage of executive compensation that is 
performance incentive based. 
 
Fourth, the influence of the firm's internal governance characteristics on its probability of adopting a clawback is 
also an open empirical question. For example, at firms where management is entrenched or exerts considerable 
power, influence, and control over the board of directors, the effectiveness of clawback provisions may be 
reduced, as such provisions are typically exercised at the discretion of the board (Babenko et al. [ 4] ).[ 12] 
Therefore, managers may willingly adopt a clawback when they believe it is unlikely to be enforced, whereas 
investors may demand additional protections in the presence of weaker internal governance structures. To 
proxy for the level of managerial entrenchment, we include: a State of Maryland incorporation indicator, a CEO 
duality indicator, the percentage of the company owned by insiders, and a poison pill indicator. Hartzell, 
Kallberg, and Liu ([ 34] ) suggest Maryland is characterized by a “management-friendly” regulatory environment, 
which thereby increases the probability of managerial entrenchment for investment firms and trusts 
incorporated within the state.[ 13] CEO duality is consistent with enhanced managerial power and control, as 
the CEO is also the board chair.[ 14] Although increased ownership by company insiders could align 
management incentives with those of broader shareholders, it may also insulate the existing management team 
from external pressures. Both of these potential influences should reduce the likelihood that a firm implements 
a compensation clawback provision.[ 15] Lastly, we include an indicator variable for whether the REIT has a 
poison pill takeover deterrent in place. As such provisions are generally regarded inconsistent with management 
accountability, we anticipate a positive association between our poison pill indicator and the likelihood a firm 
will adopt a compensation clawback. 
In addition to these measures of managerial entrenchment, we include measures of the quality of the board of 
directors, board size, independence, and whether the board is staggered.[ 16] Following Brown, Davis-Friday, 
and Guler ([ 11] ), we expect a positive relation between board size and clawback adoptions. As Addy, Chu, and 
Yoder (2009) find that independent monitoring is positively associated with clawback adoption, we expect to 
find a positive relation between board independence and clawback adoption. Finally, we include an indicator for 
whether the board is staggered. As the need to win director appointments over multiple years shields 
management from their actions, this type of board is generally viewed as weaker (Faleye [ 24] ). Therefore, we 
expect staggered boards to be more likely to adopt a clawback provision, given the findings in the literature that 
weaker boards are more likely to adopt clawback provisions. With respect to internal governance metrics, our 
main conjectures may be summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 4 (Governance) The propensity of a firm to adopt a clawback provision is inversely related to 
managerial power and entrenchment, and the strength of the firm's board. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Because of the unique regulatory environment in which REITs operate, the REIT market offers a compelling 
natural laboratory for the examination of the determinants of clawback adoption. Additionally, by focusing on 
this single industry we can control for potential extraneous influences that could hide the relations we are 
examining. One key factor that makes the REIT market such a compelling laboratory for this examination is the 
requirement that REITs must distribute 90% of their taxable income as dividends.[ 17] A consequence of this is 
that REITs often find it difficult to accumulate sufficient retained profits to fund acquisitions and/or 
development activities. This limited ability to retain profits, combined with both the scale of the typical real 
estate investment projects and the limited range of investment activities available to REITs, forces them to 
return frequently to the capital markets. Given the nature of these markets, it is not surprising that Han ([32] ) 
and Ooi ([ 36] ) both show REIT performance is sensitive to the alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders, and Danielsen et al. (2009, 2014) demonstrate that the market both values and rewards REIT 
actions that enhance the credibility of firm financial disclosures. Therefore, by focusing on the real estate 
industry we can concentrate on a focused sample of firms for which clawbacks may be of particular 
importance.[ 18] 
As such, we begin our empirical analysis by identifying all REITs tracked by SNL, with corresponding data 
available in both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases, from 1994 to 2011. 
We begin our sample in 1994 to correspond with the beginning of the modern REIT era.[ 19] Next, we identify 
whether each firm within our sample has a compensation clawback provision, and the date (year) when the 
presence of such a provision was first publicly disclosed. More specifically, following Babenko et al. ([ 4] ), we 
first examine all REIT Annual Reports (10-K), Proxy Statements (Def 14A), and Current Reports (8-K) filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Using the Morningstar Document Research search engine, each 
of these filings were searched for the terms “clawbacks,” “recoupment,” and “recovery policies.”[ 20] Across our 
18-year sample period, this process allowed us to identify 48 unique firms disclosing the possible presence of a 
clawback or compensation recoupment policy. Flagged records were then examined to ensure the noted 
provisions were indeed clawbacks. This secondary screening procedure was particularly beneficial in properly 
identifying firms with active clawback provisions, as approximately 15% of (i.e., 7) flagged records provided 
boilerplate language explicitly indicating the company did not have such a provision in place for one or more 
sample years.[ 21] To illustrate the nature of the provisions identified as being a clawback, we offer three 
examples of current REIT recoupment policies: 
AvalonBay Communities Inc. Policy on Recoupment of Incentive Compensation (Clawback Policy): The 
Board has adopted a Policy for Recoupment of Incentive Compensation (i.e., a compensation 
clawback policy), which applies to senior officers (generally senior vice presidents and above). 
Pursuant to this policy, in the event the Company is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to the material non-compliance of the Company with any financial reporting 
requirement, then an independent committee of the Board of Directors may require any 
covered officer to repay to the Company all or part of any “Excess Compensation” that such 
officer had previously received. Excess Compensation is defined as that part of the incentive 
compensation received by a covered officer during the 3-year period preceding the publication 
of the restated financial statement that was in excess of the amount that such officer would 
have received had such incentive compensation been calculated based on the financial results 
reported in the restated financial statement. 
 
Brandywine Realty Trust Clawback: Our clawback agreement with each of our executive officers 
provides that in the event of an accounting restatement due to material non-compliance with 
federal securities laws, and without regard to misconduct, we have the right to recover 
incentive-based compensation that was computed on the basis of erroneous data during the 
three-year period preceding the accounting restatement and that exceeded what should have 
been paid on the basis of the corrected data. 
 
Howard Hughes Corporation Executive Compensation Recoupment Policy: The Board has adopted a 
policy regarding recovery of incentive awards for fiscal years for which financial results are later 
restated. In the event of a material restatement of the Company's financial results due to 
misconduct, the compensation committee shall review the facts and circumstances and take the 
actions it considers appropriate with respect to any executive officer whose fraud or willful 
misconduct contributed to the need for such restatement. Such actions may include, without 
limitation, (a) seeking reimbursement of any bonus paid to such officer exceeding the amount 
that, in the judgment of the compensation committee, would have been paid had the financial 
results been properly reported and (b) seeking to recover profits received by such officer during 
the 12 months after the restated period under any equity compensation awards. All 
determinations by the compensation committee with respect to this policy shall be final and 
binding on all interested parties. 
 
 
Figure I. Percentage of Real Estate Investment Trusts with a Clawback. 
As firms rarely, if ever, retract compensation clawback provisions, for the purposes of the current investigation 
once a firm discloses the adoption of a clawback we assume that policy remains in effect until evidence is 
provided to the contrary. Using this identification strategy, we classify 392 out of a potential 2,029 firm year 
observations as being characterized by the firm having an executive compensation clawback provision. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the frequency of such clawbacks increased steadily over our sample period. At the 
beginning of our sample period, very few REITs employed such provisions. By the passage of the REIT 
Modernization Act of 1999, slightly over 10% of firms had adopted such provisions. This number basically 
doubled, to slightly over 20%, by the time the regulatory reforms brought about by SOX were instituted. SOX 
implementation further spurred the widespread adoption of these provisions, which achieved market 
penetration of approximately 30% by the passage of Dodd–Frank. Given the regulatory mandates under Dodd–
Frank, we fully anticipate the prevalence of such provisions to continue growing throughout the near future. 
After constructing our clawback indicator, we next extract balance sheet, income statement, and market 
performance data for each firm within our sample from either: Compustat, CRSP, or SNL Financial. To complete 
our data-collection process, compensation data are extracted from ExecuComp, and our governance metrics are 
compiled from a variety of sources including AuditAnalytics, Thompson Reuters Institutional Holdings, and direct 
tabulation from individual company corporate disclosures such as proxy statements and annual reports. A 
complete list of the firm-specific metrics employed throughout our empirical analysis, along with variable 
definitions, is provided in the Appendix. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each of these variables. To 
highlight a few key observations, consistent with Danielsen et al. (2009) we first note that REITs are far more 
likely than non-REIT firms to materially restate their financials. Specifically, over 62% of our sample observations 
come from firms that filed amended reports within the previous three years. The average REIT in our sample has 
total assets of slightly over $1.9 billion, market leverage values of approximately 46%, and a Tobin's Q slightly 
greater than 1.0.[ 22] 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Min Max 
Firm characteristics 
    
log(Total Assets) 2,029 6.945 1.151 10.294 
Tobin's Q 2,029 1.154 0.196 11.760 
Cash Flow 2,029 0.058 −0.608 1.330 
Stock Performance 2,029 0.003 −3.343 2.790 
Return Volatility 2,029 0.085 0.003 0.938 
Leverage 2,029 0.459 0 1.000 
Investment (%) 2,029 1.300 0 51.600 
Credit Rating 2,029 0.259 0 1 
Restatement 2,029 0.621 0 1 
External monitors 
    
Analyst Coverage 2,029 0.093 0 1 
Institutional Ownership 2,029 0.523 0.005 0.879 
Blockholdings 2,029 0.287 0 0.991 
Compensation 
    
Total Compensation 2,029 2.415 0 81.869 
Performance % 2,029 0.644 0.018 0.960 
Governance 
    
Maryland 2,029 0.596 0 1 
Board Size 2,029 8.164 3 19 
CEO Duality 2,029 0.281 0 1 
Staggered Board 2,029 0.218 0 1 
Insider Ownership 2,029 0.154 0 0.926 
Board Independence 2,029 0.709 0.250 0.842 
Poison Pill 2,029 0.064 0 1 
1 Note: This table provides descriptive statistics for all of the key variables employed throughout this investigation. Our 
sample spans 1994–2011 and represents all real estate investment trusts tracked by SNL, which also have data available in 
CRSP and Compustat. This results in 2,029 firm-year observations. In addition to these databases, several variables are 
pulled directly from firm proxy statements. The Appendix provides definitions for all variables. 
 
With respect to external monitoring attributes, less than 10% of sample firm-year observations come from REITs 
with current, active analyst coverage. Additionally, slightly over one-half of the typical sample REIT's outstanding 
shares are owned by institutional investors. Consistent with broader market trends, untabulated results indicate 
this proportion has grown steadily over time, with current averages exceeding 70%. Blockholders control nearly 
30% of the outstanding shares of the average sample REIT, though this number shows considerable variation 
across firms, ranging from 0 to over 99% of shares outstanding. Turning to compensation characteristics, we see 
the typical REIT CEO earns over $2.4 million annually, with performance-based incentives accounting for nearly 
two-thirds of that total. Finally, with respect to our governance characteristics, nearly 60% of sample firms are 
incorporated in Maryland. Additionally, nearly 30% of sample REIT CEOs also serve as chairman of their 
respective firm's board of directors. Slightly more than 20% of such boards are staggered, and inside directors 
and firm officers control just over 15% of the total shares outstanding on average. The typical REIT board is 
slightly smaller than those found in non-REIT firms (8 vs. 10), more than 70% of board positions are held by 
independent directors, and only 6% of sample firms have poison pill takeover defenses. 
Analysis 
Determinants of Clawback Adoption 
Table 2 presents the results of univariate comparisons between REITs that report the existence of a 
compensation clawback provision and REITs that do not. Consistent with a priori expectations, we find that both 
more complex firms and firms with worse performance are more likely to have a clawback provision. Specifically, 
larger firms, firms with more volatile returns, firms employing higher leverage, and firms that recently issued an 
accounting restatement are all more likely to have a clawback. Conversely, firms with better performance, 
enhanced growth options and prospects, higher cash flows, and more tangible investments are all less likely to 
have a clawback provision. With respect to external monitors, we find firms actively covered by analysts, firms 
with more institutional ownership, and firms with increased block ownership are all more likely to employ 
clawback provisions. Although consistent with our expectations regarding compensation, we find that firms with 
clawback provisions exhibit both higher overall levels of executive compensation and a higher proportion of 
incentive-based compensation. 
Table 2 Univariate Analysis of Clawback Adoption Determinants 
 
Firms with 
Clawback 
Firms without 
Clawback 
  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Difference of 
Means 
Firm characteristics 
     
log(Total Assets) 583 7.480 1,446 6.741 10.70 
Tobin's Q 583 1.069 1,446 1.187 −4.10 
Cash Flow 583 0.047 1,446 0.063 −5.63 
Stock Performance 583 −0.013 1,446 0.009 −0.99 
Return Volatility 583 0.096 1,446 0.081 4.26 
Leverage 583 0.518 1,446 0.436 8.63 
Investment 583 0.200 1,446 1.800 −7.27 
Credit Rating 583 0.184 1,446 0.288 −4.92 
Restatement 583 0.789 1,446 0.557 10.06 
External monitors 
     
Analyst Coverage 583 0.189 1,446 0.056 9.61 
Institutional 
Ownership 
583 0.629 1,446 0.483 11.10 
Blockholdings 583 0.317 1,446 0.276 4.02 
Compensation 
     
Total Compensation 583 3.204 1,446 2.115 3.75 
Performance % 583 0.719 1,446 0.616 8.00 
Governance 
     
Maryland 583 0.692 1,446 0.559 5.60 
Board Size 583 8.041 1,446 8.212 −1.59 
CEO Duality 583 0.315 1,446 0.268 2.16 
Staggered Board 583 0.215 1,446 0.219 −0.23 
Insider Ownership 583 0.139 1,446 0.159 −2.65 
Board Independence 583 0.707 1,446 0.710 −0.68 
Poison Pill 583 0.063 1,446 0.064 −0.10 
2 Note: This table presents a univariate analysis of differences in means between firm-year observations associated with 
the presence of a clawback and those without a clawback. The Appendix provides a detailed description of each variable 
employed. 
3 ***Significant at the 1% level. 
4 **Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Turning to governance attributes, we find some evidence that when management is more powerful and/or 
entrenched (Maryland incorporation and CEO duality) the firm is more likely to have a clawback provision. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that managers may not fear clawbacks when they are entrenched in the 
firm, as they may have the ability to thwart or mitigate the negative consequences of enforcement actions. 
Additionally, we note that the fraction of the firm controlled by insiders is higher at firms without a clawback 
provision. This is consistent with inside ownership aligning management's interests with shareholders, reducing 
the need for a clawback, or with inside ownership helping to insulate managers from outsider's demands for a 
clawback provision. Contrary to the prior literature, in these univariate comparisons we find no evidence of a 
relation between board strength and the adoption of a clawback. 
Although meaningful insight may often be gained from simple univariate comparisons, multivariate techniques 
typically provide broader, more generalizable intuition. As such, we continue our empirical analysis by 
estimating probit regressions of the following general form to assess the underlying determinants of clawback 
adoption:[ 23] Clawback Adoption = 𝑓𝑓(Firm Characteristics,  External Monitoring,  Compensation  Characteristics,  Corporate Governance, ε). (1) 
 
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 1 . In column 1, our compensation clawback indicator 
variable is regressed exclusively against our set of firm-specific characteristics to form a base model 
specification. Consistent with expectations, we find robust evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. More 
specifically, the positive coefficient estimates on our firm size, growth options, prior stock performance, and 
financial leverage metrics are all consistent with increased firm complexity being directly related to the 
propensity of a firm to have a clawback. Similarly, the negative coefficient estimates on our cash flow and 
investments metrics suggest enhanced financial transparency decreases the need to employ clawback provisions 
in an attempt to add certification credibility to firm disclosures. The positive coefficient estimate on the recent 
financial restatements indicator variable lends itself to this same interpretation. The only unexpected result we 
find is the positive and (marginally) significant relation between clawback adoptions and investment-grade debt 
outstanding. As this result is not robust across more complete model specifications, we simply acknowledge the 
result is inconsistent with our a priori expectations. Taken together, these results in column 1 provide relatively 
strong support for the hypothesis that clawback adoptions are directly related to both a firm's operational 
complexity and financial opacity. 
Table 3 Probit Analysis of Clawback Adoption Determinants 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant −3.824 −3.453 −4.222 −3.874 −4.309 −3.780  
(−17.07) (−14.43) (−15.76) (−16.54) (−12.54) (−9.48) 
Firm characteristics 
      
log(Total Assets) 0.242 0.126 0.114 0.203 −0.005 0.021  
(7.03) (4.86) (2.08) (5.29) (−0.10) (0.35) 
Tobin's Q 0.427 0.341 0.397 0.448 0.355 0.380  
(5.44) (4.10) (5.26) (4.78) (3.37) (3.40) 
Cash Flow −2.746 −1.085 −2.878 −2.727 −1.485 −1.409  
(−4.91) (−1.74) (−4.03) (−4.64) (−1.89) (−2.13) 
Stock Performance 0.180 0.082 0.197 0.176 0.094 0.024  
(2.58) (1.19) (2.93) (2.68) (1.33) (0.30) 
Return Volatility 0.616 0.030 0.569 0.499 −0.150 −0.817  
(1.07) (0.04) (1.05) (0.90) (−0.21) (−1.58) 
Leverage 1.209 1.459 1.569 1.323 1.802 1.324  
(6.26) (6.36) (6.65) (6.27) (5.92) (4.72) 
Investment −1.077 −0.940 −1.073 −1.099 −1.066 −1.118  
(−2.69) (−2.72) (−2.83) (−2.64) (−2.67) (−2.58) 
Credit Rating 0.083 0.157 0.041 0.031 −0.032 −0.009  
(1.73) (3.24) (0.80) (0.64) (−0.58) (−0.31) 
Restatement 0.334 0.416 0.366 0.325 0.463 0.467  
(2.32) (5.08) (2.36) (2.34) (4.78) (4.59) 
Monitoring 
      
Analyst Coverage 
 
0.511 
  
0.556 0.572   
(3.32) 
  
(3.11) (3.24) 
Institutional Ownership 
 
0.863 
  
0.443 0.036   
(8.12) 
  
(4.18) (0.32) 
Blockholdings 
 
−0.405 
  
−0.253 −0.301   
(−2.00) 
  
(−0.97) (−1.25) 
Compensation 
      
Total Compensation 
  
−0.001 
 
0.000 0.010    
(−0.14) 
 
(0.05) (1.98) 
Performance % 
  
1.664 
 
1.677 1.492    
(10.61) 
 
(8.00) (7.01) 
Governance 
      
Maryland 
   
0.007 −0.082 −0.145     
(0.17) (−2.00) (−4.21) 
Board Size 
   
0.041 0.062 0.079 
    
(3.01) (3.84) (4.60) 
CEO Duality 
   
0.045 −0.135 −0.150     
(1.11) (−3.68) (−5.06) 
Staggered Board 
   
0.229 0.288 0.260     
(3.75) (3.78) (2.95) 
Insider Ownership 
   
−0.935 −0.490 −0.419     
(−3.86) (−1.54) (−1.10) 
Board Independence 
   
0.043 0.211 −0.235     
(0.16) (0.64) (−0.55) 
Poison Pill 
   
0.190 −0.032 −0.211     
(3.18) (−0.37) (−3.50)        
Property type fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 
Pseudo R2 (%) 0.2013 0.2232 0.2365 0.2099 0.2581 0.2418 
5 Note: This table presents the results of our multivariate probit analysis investigating the presence of a 
clawback provision. Specifically, in columns 1–5 we regress an indicator variables capturing the presence of a 
clawback provision against firm characteristics, external monitoring proxies, compensation attributes, and 
corporate governance metrics. In column 6, the dependent variable is a firm-specific clawback indicator that 
equals 1 if the firm has a clawback provision uniquely tailored to the firm, as opposed to a clawback that simply 
explicitly affirms the real estate investment trust's regulatory rights to recoup unfairly awarded compensation. 
The Appendix provides a detailed description of each variable employed. 
6 ***Significant at the 1% level. 
7 ** Significant at the 5% level. 
8 Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Column 2 of Table 3 extends the base case analysis to include three measures of the firm's external monitoring 
environment. With the exception of prior stock performance, which is no longer statistically significant, all 
previous measures retain both their previously observed signs and significance patterns. Examining our three 
new variables, both analyst coverage and institutional ownership exhibit positive and statistically significant 
associations with clawback adoptions. These results are consistent with the notion that external monitors may 
increase the effectiveness of clawback provisions, whereas the negative relation between blockholdings and 
clawbacks is consistent with the notion that the presence of a strong external monitor, with significant capital at 
risk, reduces the ability of managers to engage in short-term manipulations. 
Column 3 of Table 3 presents the results of extending our base analysis to examine compensation metrics. 
Relative to column 1, coefficient estimates for all firm characteristics except the presence of an investment-
grade credit rating retain their previously reported signs and statistical significance. Our credit rating variable, 
though retaining an unexpected positive sign, is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. Turning 
to our new compensation attributes, although clawback provisions do not appear to be related to total 
executive compensation, we do find evidence that the likelihood that a firm has a clawback provision is 
positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation that is performance based. This is consistent with both 
our Hypothesis 3 and the previously noted findings of Chen, Greene, and Owers ([ 15] ) and Babenko et al. ([ 4] ). 
Column 4 of Table 3 presents the results for the model including our governance metrics and baseline firm 
characteristics. As with the findings in column 3, all firm characteristics except the presence of an investment-
grade credit rating (which is again positive but insignificant) are qualitatively identical to our column 1 base 
model results. Four of the seven governance metrics exhibit statistically significant relations with clawback 
adoptions, with all exhibiting the generally anticipated sign pattern. More specifically, the positive coefficient 
estimates on our board size, staggered board, and poison pill indicator variables, as well as the negative 
coefficient estimate on the proportion of stock holdings owned by company officers and directors, are all 
consistent with Hypothesis 4 and the logic that clawback provisions are more prevalent among firms with 
weaker boards and firms owned by a higher proportion of insiders. 
Column 5 of Table 3 provides the results of simultaneously including all of our monitoring, compensation, and 
governance metrics in the base model (firm characteristics) specification. The results observed when we 
simultaneously include all four categories of variables at once are generally consistent with those observed 
when each category is added in isolation. This finding is particularly true with respect to the attributes 
previously identified as being uniquely important in REIT markets. Specifically, our growth options (Tobin's Q), 
debt usage (Leverage), and disclosure transparency (Restatement) measures of firm complexity all exhibit 
positive and strongly significant coefficient estimates. These findings are consistent with the notion that capital 
constraints engendered by regulatory payout requirements incentivize REITs to enhance the transparency of 
their disclosures. For example, firms with abundant growth opportunities may benefit from improved disclosure 
credibility through reduced transactions costs on future capital acquisitions and/or recontracting opportunities. 
Similarly, clawback adoption may be particularly useful in reducing uncertainty for REIT firms in the immediate 
aftermath of accounting restatements, thereby facilitating continued access to capital markets on attractive 
terms.[ 24] We interpret the general strength and consistency of these results as reflecting positively on the 
robustness of the underlying relations. 
Exploring the results in column 5 of Table 3 in more detail, relative to our previously reported results across 
columns 1 through 4, we note three key changes. First, our state of Maryland incorporation indicator variable 
now exhibits a negative and significant coefficient. Second, our CEO duality indicator, another potential measure 
of managerial power and entrenchment, also exhibits a negative coefficient. As Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2008) 
suggest incorporating in Maryland (as the majority of REITs do) is associated with stronger, more entrenched 
management, these new results are consistent with our earlier finding that firms with weaker governance, 
weaker boards, and poison pills are more likely to have a clawback. We also note that both the percentage of 
the firm held by blockholders and the poison pill indicator are no longer statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Taken together, we view the results presented in column 5 as generally supporting and reinforcing our 
previous findings. 
Although significant care was put into ensuring the proper identification of firms exhibiting clawback provisions 
in their executive compensation contracts, the degree of disclosure relating to both the scope and enforcement 
intensity of such provisions varied markedly across sample firms. And although the previously noted examples of 
clawback policies for AvalonBay Communities, Brandywine Realty Trust, and Howard Hughes Corporation are 
relatively complete and explicit, other firms simply affirm their recoupment rights with direct references to 
regulatory statutes. For example, consider the following passage from the 2007 proxy statement filed by Equity 
One Inc.: 
Recovery of Performance-Based Awards: We do not have a policy regarding the recovery of 
performance-based awards in the event of a financial statement restatement beyond the requirements 
of Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. That statute requires the chief executive and chief 
financial officers of a publicly-held company to repay certain amounts if the company restates its 
financial statements as a result of financial reporting misconduct. The amounts to be repaid consist of 
( 1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received from the company 
during a twelve month period following the filing of the financial document in question; and ( 2) any 
profits realized from the sale of securities of the company during that period. 
 
As the firm explicitly espouses its regulatory rights to recoup unjust awards, throughout the model specifications 
in columns 1 through 5 of Table 3 we code these firms as possessing a clawback. That said, we acknowledge the 
possibility that the determinants of employing clawbacks driven by regulatory mandates may diverge from those 
driving the voluntary adoption of uniquely tailored declarations and provisions. As such, we construct a new 
“firm-specific” clawback indicator variable that excludes observations that are simply explicit references to the 
rights and responsibilities outlined in existing SOX and/or Dodd–Frank regulations. This firm-specific clawback 
indicator, which identifies only organizations with uniquely tailored, company-specific policies, serves as the 
dependent variable for column 6 in Table 3.[ 25] 
Once again, our results remain consistent and stable. Relative to our full model results presented in column 5 of 
Table 3, determinants of the adoption for these more uniquely tailored, voluntary provisions are similar. More 
specifically, we observe only three material differences. First, our institutional ownership metric, though 
retaining a notionally positive coefficient estimate, now fails to attain statistical significance. Second, consistent 
with the aforementioned literature, within this more restrictive identification set of clawbacks we now observe a 
positive association between the presence of such a provision and total executive compensation levels. Third, 
we find the presence of a poison pill is negatively associated with the presence of a firm-specific clawback 
provision. Potentially, although these firms recognize the need for a clawback provision, management may be 
sufficiently powerful to prevent any clawback beyond that required by the new regulation. Given the relative 
consistency of our findings, we conclude the determinants of firm-specific clawback adoptions are generally 
similar to those found for the broader cross-section of such provisions, and therefore we retain our broader 
definition metric for use throughout our remaining empirical tests.[26] 
The Impact of Firm Growth Prospects on Clawback Adoption 
One of the often-cited benefits associated with the adoption of clawback provisions is that they enhance the 
(perceived) reporting quality of a firm's financial disclosures (see, e.g., Chen, Greene, and Owers [ 15] ; DeHaan, 
Hodge, and Shevlin [ 21] ; Chan et al. [ 13] ). Such implicit certification effects are likely to be particularly 
important to firms during the capital acquisition process. Hence, clawback policies are likely of unique relevance 
to cash-constrained firms with growth ambitions. One of the expressed advantages associated with our focus on 
the REIT industry is that firms in this industry are frequently capital constrained. As outlined above, the high 
regulatory-mandated payout requirement (i.e., 90% of taxable income) for REIT firms effectively limits their 
ability to fund growth through internally generated profit and cash-flow retention. As such, the greater the 
growth and expansion plans of the REIT, the more binding these payout restrictions become, the higher the 
need to continually access external capital markets, and therefore, the greater the benefits of enhanced 
financial reporting quality through implicit certification mechanisms such as compensation clawback provisions. 
We explore the impact of a firm's growth options on the presence of a clawback provision in Table 4. 
Specifically, we split our sample into high-growth (high market-to-book) and low-growth (low market-to-book) 
subsamples based on the prior year's market-to-book ratio.[ 27] Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the results 
of reestimating column 5 of Table 3 for the high- and low-growth subsamples, respectively. Several of the 
relations observed in the full sample appear consistent across these two subsamples. Specifically, the relations 
between the presence of a clawback and leverage, investments, prior restatements, the percentage of CEO 
compensation tied to performance, and whether the board is staggered are all directionally and statistically 
similar across the two subsamples. However, simply looking at the results from these two subsamples does not 
allow us to test for differences in the relation between the two subsamples. Additionally, several characteristics 
seem to have opposite relations with the presence of a clawback provision. For example, examining our proxies 
for external monitoring, we find that institutional ownership appears to be negatively related to clawbacks in 
the high-growth subsample, but monitoring metrics (analyst coverage and institutional ownership) are positively 
related to clawbacks in the low-growth subsample. 
Table 4 Market-to-Book Subsample Analysis 
 
High Low High M-to-B Interactions 
Constant −4.627 −5.814 −5.690  
(−10.33) (−7.47) (−7.72) 
High M-to-B dummy 
  
0.865    
(1.04) 
Firm characteristics 
   
log(Total Assets) 0.162 −0.004 0.212  
(2.55) (−0.05) (2.29) 
Tobin's Q 0.786 0.174 0.446  
(6.74) (0.49) (1.55) 
Cash Flow −1.988 −0.628 −0.804  
(−1.39) (−0.30) (−0.35) 
Stock Performance 0.064 −0.005 0.166  
(0.26) (−0.04) (0.64) 
Return Volatility 0.454 −0.163 0.804  
(0.42) (−0.14) (0.73) 
Leverage 2.462 1.217 1.437  
(6.24) (2.25) (2.75) 
Investment −0.801 −4.271 3.949  
(−3.34) (−3.05) (2.35) 
Credit Rating −0.391 0.227 −0.483  
(−3.11) (1.71) (−3.66) 
Restatement 0.453 0.692 −0.307  
(3.66) (5.02) (−3.36) 
Monitoring 
   
Analyst Coverage 0.482 0.819 −0.500  
(1.63) (4.04) (−2.73) 
Institutional Ownership −0.625 0.916 −1.256  
(−2.92) (3.07) (−3.06) 
Blockholdings −0.411 −0.596 0.176  
(−1.04) (−1.72) (0.43) 
Compensation 
   
Total Compensation 0.009 −0.012 0.019  
(1.32) (−0.92) (1.21) 
Performance % 2.181 1.873 0.072  
(4.03) (6.42) (0.15) 
Governance 
   
Maryland −0.574 0.476 −1.015  
(−5.43) (4.01) (−9.18) 
Board Size 0.002 0.053 −0.055  
(0.06) (1.88) (−1.36) 
CEO Duality −0.025 −0.555 0.594  
(−0.27) (−7.86) (3.93) 
Staggered Board 0.429 0.352 −0.031  
(2.76) (2.88) (−0.17) 
Insider Ownership −0.956 −0.139 −1.623  
(−1.35) (−0.24) (−1.52) 
Board Independence −0.807 2.120 −2.366  
(−2.13) (3.27) (−3.38) 
Poison Pill −0.113 0.445 −0.766  
(−0.49) (2.14) (−2.64)     
Property type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 1,016 1,013 2,029 
Pseudo R2 (%) 0.3099 0.3551 0.3121 
9 Note: This table presents the results of regressing an indicator variable capturing the presence of a clawback provision 
against firm characteristics, external monitoring proxies, compensation, and corporate governance metrics, across high- 
and low-growth subsamples. Specifically, for column 1, our regression sample contains only high-growth real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), defined as those exhibiting a market-to-book ratio for the previous year that is above the industry 
median. Similarly, for column 2, our regression sample contains only low-growth REITs, defined as those exhibiting a 
market-to-book ratio for the previous year this is below the industry median. In column 3, we employ the full sample and 
estimate the impact of firm growth prospects by interacting our firm characteristics, external monitoring proxies, 
compensation, and corporate governance metrics with our high-growth indicator. The coefficients reported in column 3 are 
directly from these interaction terms. M-to-B stands for market-to-book ratio. The Appendix provides a detailed description 
of each variable employed. 
10 ***Significant at the 1% level. 
11 **Significant at the 5% level. 
12 * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Therefore, to test for differences between these two groups, we retain all sample observations and interact a 
dummy variable identifying high-growth firm-year observations with every previously employed clawback 
determinant examined. The reported coefficient estimates in column 3 of Table 4 correspond to these 
interaction terms and measure the incremental effect of each characteristic within growth-intensive firms.[ 28] 
We note that for high-growth firms, the relation between clawbacks and firm complexity (size and leverage), as 
well as investment activity, is stronger than for low-growth firms. Conversely, the effect of recent financial 
restatements, as well as having investment-grade debt outstanding, appears stronger for low-growth firms. 
Additionally, and consistent with the observed differences between the high- and low-growth groups, the 
influence of external monitors appears concentrated within the low-growth subsample. Continuing, we find no 
evidence of differences in the relation between compensation and clawbacks across the two groups. Finally, 
with respect to our governance measures, we observe four key differences across our growth classifications. 
These differences reveal the previously observed negative relation between clawback adoption propensities and 
Maryland incorporation status (one proxy for managerial entrenchment) is driven by the subset of high-growth 
firms within our sample. Conversely, the negative relation observed for CEO duality is driven by low-growth 
firms. The impact of poison pills and board independence are also stronger among firms with low growth 
potential. The results presented in Table 4 illustrate the importance of controlling for a firm's likely growth 
prospects when examining clawbacks, as growth prospects appear to exert a significant impact on many of the 
observed relations. 
The Impact of Clawback Provisions 
Having presented evidence regarding the characteristics of REITs that influence the probability of adopting a 
clawback, we next turn to the potential effect of clawback provisions on firm performance. Although 
conceptually measuring the market's response to clawback adoption decisions should be relatively 
straightforward, in practice the clean identification of an actual event date becomes problematic. For example, 
clawback adoptions are often the result of extensive discussions and negotiations between managers and 
company stakeholders over an extended period or, alternatively, are implemented in response to either 
regulatory mandates or perceptions of suboptimal managerial performance. In the former case, how should the 
event date be defined if the ongoing discussions were public knowledge, and the resulting adoption of the policy 
was a foregone conclusion by the time of official implementation and disclosure in the firm's proxy statement? 
In the latter case, the confounding influences of regulatory and competitive market pressures make isolation of 
the wealth effects attributable to clawback adoption difficult. Further complicating this process, public 
disclosure of the adoption of clawback provisions typically occurs through corporate regulatory filings (e.g., 
annual reports, proxy statements) rather than through specially convened press conferences or independent 
news releases. As such, the information disclosure is typically not timely and is almost always accompanied by 
potentially confounding information disclosures.[ 29] Recognizing these limitations, to gain some insight into the 
market relevance of REIT clawback adoptions, in Table 5 we compare both monthly raw returns and abnormal 
returns from a traditional four-factor Fama–French–Carhart model across firms with and without compensation 
clawback provisions. To be clear, these returns are not designed to measure the market's response to the 
adoption of such provisions, but rather provide one indication of the firm's relative market performance after 
such adoptions. To the extent clawbacks serve as a disciplining mechanism that helps align performance 
incentives between managers and shareholders, firms characterized by the presence of such provisions may 
outperform their counterparts without such policies. 
Table 5 Analysis of Clawbacks and Monthly Market Performance 
 
With Clawback Without Clawback   
 
 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Difference of Means 
Monthly raw returns (%) 4,089 1.37 13,065 1.14 2.03 
Monthly four-factor residual 4,089 0.24 13,065 −0.08 3.15 
Low market-to-book 
     
Monthly raw returns (%) 2,214 1.08 5,933 0.77 1.83 
Monthly four-factor residual 2,214 −0.08 5,933 −0.47 2.58 
High market-to-book 
     
Monthly raw returns (%) 1,875 1.71 7,132 1.44 1.73 
Monthly four-factor residual 1,875 0.62 7,132 0.25 2.74 
13 Note: This table presents a univariate analysis of the difference in means for both monthly raw returns and Fama–
French–Carhart four-factor return residuals, between firm-month observations in which the firm has a clawback provision 
and those in which the firm does not have a clawback provision. As we are not attempting to predict abnormal returns, we 
use the entire return history to determine residual returns. The Appendix provides a detailed description of each variable 
examined. 
14 ***Significant at the 1% level. 
15 **Significant at the 5% level. 
16 * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Examining the results in Table 5, we find evidence of positive performance externalities associated with 
clawback provisions. More specifically, within the full sample of firms, both monthly raw returns and abnormal 
returns (four-factor residuals) are significantly higher for firms with active clawback provisions.[ 30] Similar 
results are also found across both high- and low-growth subsamples. With respect to low-growth firms, raw 
returns for REITs with clawbacks are again significantly higher than those observed for firms without such 
provisions, and risk-adjusted abnormal returns are significantly less negative among low-growth REITs with 
clawback protections. Turning to the high-growth subsample, firms with clawbacks again enjoy both higher raw 
returns and risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest REITs with 
compensation clawback provisions tend to outperform those without such provisions. 
Although the previous results suggest firms with clawback provisions enjoy enhanced market performance, Chan 
et al. ([ 14] ) note that the presence of a clawback can engender unintended consequences. Managers may 
switch from short-term financial manipulation to manipulating real transactions to meet their short-term 
performance goals. To the extent firm managers alter the timing, payment, or receipt of real investment cash 
flows to meet short-term performance benchmarks, firm performance and shareholder utility may be affected. 
Our final analysis seeks to ascertain whether the fundamental operating performance of REIT organizations 
differs across firms with and without clawback provisions. Following Chan et al., we examine changes in firm 
operating performance as a function of both the presence of a compensation clawback provision and changes in 
key firm attribute levels. More formally, we seek to examine the following economic relation: 
Δ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽2Δ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3Δ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽4Δ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 + 𝛿𝛿 +∈, (2) 
 
where δ represents time (year) fixed effects. Within the REIT industry, funds from operations (FFO) is widely 
regarded as the cornerstone measure of firm operating performance.[ 31] Therefore, in operationalizing the 
above test, we measure changes in a firm's operating performance as the annual percentage change in FFO. As 
with our market performance analysis, to the extent clawback provisions act as disciplining devices to better 
align the incentives of managers and shareholders, we would expect the presence of a clawback provision to be 
associated with positive changes in firm performance levels. 
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. Consistent with expectations, in column 1 we observe a positive 
association between changes in a firm's operating performance and the existence of a clawback provision. 
Column 2 provides similar results using our previously described firm-specific versus regulatory-mandated 
clawback definitions. The results suggest uniquely crafted, firm-specific provisions have very little association 
with changes in firm operating performance, whereas provisions that make specific reference to the enabling 
regulations are associated with positive and strong improvements in REIT FFO. As clawback adoption proclivities 
may include a temporal component, in column 3 of Table 6 we separate our clawback indicator based on the 
chronological timing of the provision's adoption. More specifically, as outlined by Addy and Yoder ([ 2] ), 
effective December 29, 2006, SEC Regulation S-K, Section 402(b)(viii) was amended to require disclosure of 
compensation clawback provisions. Furthermore, as REITs face a regulatory mandate that fiscal year-ends 
equate to calendar year-ends, these amendments effectively mandate public disclosure of compensation 
clawbacks for all REITs beginning with fiscal year 2006. Although these public disclosure requirements do not 
explicitly force firms to adopt clawback provisions (Section 954 of Dodd–Frank does that), relative to the earlier 
period they invite increased public scrutiny of firm decisions along this dimension. Thus, we identify firms that 
voluntarily adopted and disclosed clawback provisions before 2006 as “early adopters” and firms exhibiting 
initial clawback declarations in 2006 or later as “late adopters.” 
Table 6 Analysis of Clawbacks and Accounting Performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.382 0.452 0.791  
(0.39) (0.47) (0.82) 
Clawback 2.779 
  
 
(3.18) 
  
Firm Specific 
 
−0.024 
 
  
(−0.02) 
 
Regulatory Mandated 
 
11.797 
 
  
(6.95) 
 
Early Adopter 
  
−0.079    
(−0.08) 
Late Adopter 
  
13.056    
(7.32) 
TA Change 0.546 0.505 0.583  
(1.91) (1.79) (2.06) 
M-to-B Change 1.453 1.436 1.445  
(6.69) (6.69) (6.75) 
Leverage Change 0.213 0.125 0.098  
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03)     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 1,683 1,683 1,683 
R2 0.051 0.075 0.078 
17 Note: In this table we examine the influence of a clawback on accounting performance. Specifically, we examine the 
relation between the presence of a clawback and the percentage change in funds from operations (FFO). In addition to 
examining our simple clawback identifier, we also differentiate between clawbacks along two dimensions. In column 2, we 
examine firm-specific versus regulatory mandated clawbacks. In column 3, we examine early clawback adopters versus late 
clawback adopters. We follow Chan et al. ( 13) and model the change in a firm's accounting performance as a function of 
the presence of a clawback, as well as changes in total assets, market-to-book ratios, and firm leverage. Fixed effects for 
time (year) are also included in all model specifications. The Appendix provides a detailed description of all variables 
employed throughout this analysis. 
18 ***Significant at the 1% level. 
19 Significant at the 5% level. 
20 Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Examining the results in column 3 of Table 6, we find that the positive relation between changes in operating 
performance (FFO) and the existence of clawback provisions is driven by late adopters. To the extent market 
discipline, competitive pressures, and/or regulatory foresight responses drive these late adoptions, this finding is 
consistent with Davis-Friday, Fried, and Jenkins (2011). They find that mandatory clawback adoptions are 
associated with enhanced market responses to earnings surprises, whereas voluntary clawback adoptions 
provide little to no certification benefit. Conversely, these findings stand in stark contrast to the predictions of 
Denis ([ 22] ), who argues mandatory (e.g., late) adopters have different incentives from voluntary (e.g., early) 
adopters, and are likely to pursue relatively weak clawback provisions. Additionally, as Section 954 of Dodd–
Frank charges a company's board of directors with clawback enforcement, Denis contends that late adopters will 
likely lack the enforcement intensity of firms that proactively and voluntarily embraced such structures. The 
results in column 3 of Table 6 do not support these assertions. Finally, in additional, untabulated analyses we 
examine the relation between clawback adoption and firm profitability (FFO) across subsamples to explore the 
impact of several REIT-specific characteristics. Unfortunately, because of the limited size of our subsamples, our 
comparison tests generally lack power. However, the positive relation between a clawback provision and FFO 
appears to be concentrated among REITs headquartered in Maryland. Specifically, Maryland REITs with a 
clawback provision report significantly higher accounting profitability (FFO) than do their in-state peers without 
such provisions. This is not surprising given the consensus belief than Maryland is relatively promanagement, 
and thus the potential benefits of constraining managerial behavior are disproportionately high for firms 
headquartered within the state. It is interesting that REITs not incorporated in Maryland do not report 
differences in FFO across clawback adoption status. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The unique features of REITs and REIT markets make them a compelling laboratory in which to further our 
understanding of the forces at play within the agency and contracting environments affecting compensation 
policies. In particular, the mandatory distribution requirements of REITs, though limiting their capital retention, 
effectively forces firms within this industry to frequently return to the capital markets to raise money to fund 
growth. Therefore, managers of firms within the REIT industry likely have more frequent occasions, as well as 
reasons, to engage in earnings management or various other forms of financial misrepresentation in attempts to 
minimize their costs of capital acquisition. Similarly, the benefits of contracting provisions that mitigate such 
perverse incentives may be particularly strong within the industry. 
Against this backdrop, the current investigation explores the determinants of compensation clawback policy 
adoptions for REIT organizations. The use and implementation of compensation clawback provisions has grown 
markedly over the past two decades, notably spurred by the regulatory reforms enacted through both SOX and 
Dodd–Frank. 
Summarizing our core results, we find that clawback provisions are more common among larger and more 
complex firms, as well as those with enhanced growth prospects, increased leverage, lower cash flows, 
enhanced monitoring incentives, and larger CEO pay for performance incentive structures. Additionally, we 
report some evidence that firms with relatively weak governance structures may be more likely to adopt 
clawback provisions, whereas more powerful and/or entrenched managers may be able to avoid the potentially 
costly implementation of such provisions. We also find that a firm's growth potential has an impact on clawback 
adoption and, further, that the presence of a clawback is associated with both enhanced market returns and 
operating cash flows. These latter operating performance results appear to be driven by relatively late adopters 
of clawbacks and those whose provisions are more tightly linked with regulatory mandates. Taken together, 
these findings provide strong support for the notion that compensation clawback provisions are a value-
relevant, strategic governance mechanism for firms within the REIT industry. 
Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Clawback Equals 1 if the firm exhibits a clawback in that particular year, and 0 otherwise 
Firm Specific Equals 1 if a firm has a clawback that is uniquely tailored for the firm, and 0 otherwise 
Regulatory 
Mandated 
Equals 1 if the firm's clawback provision simply and explicitly recognizes their regulatory 
right to recoup unjust awards, and 0 otherwise 
Early Adopter Equals 1 for firms that disclose the adoption of a clawback before 2006, and 0 otherwise 
Late Adopter Equals 1 for firms that disclose the adoption of a clawback in 2006 or later, and 0 
otherwise 
log(Total Assets) Natural log of a firm's total assets 
Tobin's Q Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the equity market capitalization of the 
firm, all divided by total assets 
Cash Flow Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets 
Stock 
Performance 
Stock return of the firm during the previous year 
Return Volatility Standard deviation of the firm's daily stock returns in the previous year 
Leverage Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by the book value of debt plus 
market capitalization of the firm 
Investment Capital expenditures (CAPX) of the firm divided by total assets 
Credit Rating Equals 0 if the debt of the firm is anything other than investment grade (BB+ and below 
or not available/reported), and 1 otherwise 
Restatement Indicator variable identifying REITS that have issued a restatement in the prior three 
years (yes = 1), 0 otherwise 
Analyst Coverage Indicator variable identifying REITs that are being actively covered by analysts (yes = 1), 0 
otherwise 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Shares held by institutions (SHROUT2 in Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings Master 
File) divided by the firm's total shares outstanding (SHROUT in Compustat) 
Blockholdings Proportion of the firm held by entities with at least a 5% stake in the company, as 
reported on the firm's proxy statement 
Total 
Compensation 
CEO compensation divided by 1,000, Execucomp TDC1 / 1000 
Performance % Difference between the CEO's total compensation minus base compensation, divided by 
total compensation 
Maryland Indicator variable identifying real estate investment trusts (REITs) incorporated in 
Maryland (yes = 1), and 0 otherwise 
Board Size Number of directors on the REIT's board, as reported on the firm's proxy statement 
CEO Duality Indicator variable identifying REITs where the CEO also serves as the chairman of the 
board (yes = 1), and 0 otherwise 
Staggered Board Indicator variable identifying REITs with staggered boards (yes = 1), and 0 otherwise 
Insider Ownership Ownership of the firm's directors and officers as reported on the firm's proxy statement, 
as a percentage of total shares outstanding 
Board 
Independence 
Number of independent directors divided by the size of the board, as reported on the 
firm's proxy statement 
Poison Pill Equals 1 if the firm reports the presence of a poison pill antitakeover deterrent, and 0 
otherwise 
Footnotes 
1 For example, consider a privately informed CEO of a firm that is preparing a capital offering. If the CEO 
discloses negative information, the offering will be more difficult to complete and/or the cost of capital 
will increase. But if the CEO conceals this information, the offering is more likely to succeed and lower the 
firm's short‐run financing costs. However, once the obfuscation is eventually discovered the firm is likely 
to lose trust, credibility, and goodwill in the marketplace. Ultimately, such actions are likely to hinder or 
prevent the firm from being able to raise capital on attractive terms (if at all) in the future. 
2 See, for example, Fisk (26) and Babenko et al. (4) for additional discussion and analysis of the history and 
background of clawback provisions. 
3 Although passed and signed into law on July 21, 2010, final implementation rules for many provisions of Dodd–
Frank are still pending. 
4 Fried and Shilon (27) report that despite the widespread attention given to clawback mandates required by 
Dodd–Frank, by mid‐year 2010 nearly half of all S&P 500 firms were yet to institute such recovery 
provisions. Furthermore, of those firms with clawbacks, the provisions were relatively weak, with 81% 
granting the board of directors discretion to waive enforcement mechanisms if the board determines the 
executive in question is not guilty of material misconduct. 
5 The growth in clawback provision adoption has been even more pronounced among the S&P 500 subsample of 
firms, increasing from less than 1% of firms in 2000 to nearly 70% of firms by 2011. 
6 Fung et al. (28) provide a similar analysis and conclude clawback adoptions are associated with reduced fraud 
risk, but the effects are greatly diminished in the presence of insider trading. 
7 Support for the benefits of compensation clawback provision adoption within an international context is 
provided by Allen and Li (3). They demonstrate clawback adoptions are associated with reduced 
politically connected lending within the Chinese banking sector. 
8 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 requires firms selling assets to the government through 
TARP to adopt clawback provisions designed to recoup bonuses and incentive‐based compensation 
illegitimately earned under disclosures later proven to be materially incorrect. 
9 As noted above, Chan et al. (13), Chan, Chen, and Chen (12), and Gao, Iskandar‐Datta, and Jia (29) all report 
evidence that the quality of the financial data released by the firm increases following clawback 
adoption. We also note that a negative relation between investment spending and clawback adoption 
could result from real transactions management on the part of managers attempting to meet short‐term 
performance benchmarks. 
10 We note that although Institutional Ownership and Blockholdings are significantly related, the correlation is 
below 0.25, and that our results are qualitatively similar with the inclusion of either metric in isolation. 
11 See Bettis et al. (7, 8) for additional discussion of performance vesting provisions and their effects on 
executive compensation. 
12 Babenko et al (4) find that the executive committee is the primary enforcer of a clawback provision (59.5%), 
followed by the entire board (33.5%). 
13 Much like Delaware for S&P 500 firms, Maryland serves as a nexus of incorporation within REIT markets. Of 
note with regard to managerial entrenchment, Maryland's Unsolicited Takeover Act (MUTA) allows for a 
variety of defenses against hostile takeovers including, but not limited to, empowering management to 
stagger or classify the board without shareholder approval. 
14 Dayha, McConnell, and Travlos (20) find evidence that CEO turnover following poor performance is higher 
when the CEO does not serve as the chairman of the board. 
15 Note that in the extreme, high levels of inside ownership could theoretically give a manager complete control 
over a company's board of directors. Under such a scenario, managers may welcome the adoption of 
clawback provisions to appease shareholder concerns, with the full knowledge that such provisions 
would likely never be enforced. Diffuse ownership regulatory requirements within REIT markets, 
including the 5/50 rule in which the top 5 shareholders may not combine to own more than 50% of an 
individual REIT's outstanding shares, effectively mitigate this concern. 
16 Bebchuk and Cohen (5) present evidence that firms with staggered boards have lower valuations. 
17 Before the REIT Modernization Act of 1999 this threshold was 95%. Given the large depreciation deductions of 
many REIT organizations, cash flow may dramatically exceed taxable income and thereby weaken the 
binding nature of this constraint. Consistent with this notion, Wang, Erickson, and Gau (41) document 
average payout ratios of over 100% for firms within this industry. Nevertheless, the regulation clearly 
imposes hurdles and constraints to cash‐flow retention not faced by firms in other industries. 
18 In limiting our analysis to a single industry, we must obviously be concerned with the generalizability of our 
findings. Although the aforementioned mandatory payout requirements likely increase the benefits of 
clawback provisions for REIT firms, possibly making them more likely to adopt a clawback than similarly 
situation non‐REITs, it should not fundamentally alter the drivers of clawback adoption beyond making 
them stronger and easier to empirically detect. 
19 Before the early 1990s, active participation by institutional investors within this market sector was effectively 
discouraged by unique regulatory provisions. This paradigm evolved rapidly following a series of Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) private letter rulings in the latter 1980s and the development of umbrella 
partnership REIT (UPREIT) organizational forms. Although virtually all REIT market observers agree that 
the dynamics of the marketplace fundamentally changed during the early 1990s, pinpointing the exact 
date of this paradigm shift is more difficult. Although many market analysts and observers point to the 
Kimco Realty initial public offering in 1991 as the beginning of the modern REIT era, it was not until 1993 
that the REIT markets began to experience exponential growth. As such, and consistent with several 
studies in the literature, we choose 1994 as our conservative estimate of the beginning of the modern 
REIT era and thus the beginning of our sample period. In practice, the actual start date for our analysis 
makes little difference, as clawback provisions were virtually nonexistent within this market sector until 
the mid to late 1990s. 
20 For completeness, additional search strings using variants of each of these keywords were also employed. 
21 For example, numerous corporate disclosures by Acadia Realty Trust contain the following proviso, “The 
Compensation Committee is considering the adoption of a policy relating to the recoupment of stock 
awards and their proceeds if an NEO's fraud or misconduct triggers a material financial restatement. No 
such policy currently exists.” Similar language is offered across a variety of filings by Cedar Realty Trust. 
Their disclosures state, “The Company does not currently have any clawback or other compensation 
recovery policy with respect to compensation that may have been paid on the basis of incorrect financial 
results. The Company is considering adopting such a policy in advance of the enactment of new 
regulations under the Dodd‐Frank Act.” 
22 In general, these numbers suggest our sample REITs are slightly larger than, but otherwise similar to, the 
broad cross‐section of REITs examined in prior studies (see, e.g., Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans 25; Boudry, 
Kallberg, and Liu 2010; Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler 2011). 
23 As with the vast majority of empirical investigations into contracting and corporate‐governance‐related 
issues, the potential for endogeneity to significantly influence results and/or their interpretation is 
present throughout the current investigation. As such, we view our results as identifying previously 
undocumented correlations between key variables of interest rather than as unbiased evidence of 
deterministic causation. Further research is needed in this area. 
24 Conversely, but again consistent with prior arguments, we find our ownership metrics to be insignificant. This 
result may be attributable (at least in part) to the disperse ownership regulations facing this industry. 
25 We note that although some of the clawback provisions provide details regarding the breadth of triggers, 
depth of coverage, and the body charged with enforcing the provision, most of our sample does not 
provide details along at least one of these dimensions. 
26 Employing our firm‐specific clawback definition yields qualitatively similar results to those reported 
throughout the remaining analysis. 
27 Although the reported results split our sample at the median, in untabulated tests we observe qualitatively 
similar results examining high and low market‐to‐book terciles. 
28 Although not explicitly reported, to ensure completeness and econometric integrity, model specifications in 
column 3 of Table also include the main effect terms for each interactive variable. 
29 Despite these limitations, in unreported regression results we attempt to measure the wealth effects of 
clawback provision adoption using standard event‐study methodology techniques and employing the 
filing date of the company's first public disclosure containing reference to the clawback provision as the 
event date. These efforts met with limited success. 
30 The positive alphas reported for REIT returns in Table are consistent with the findings of Kallberg, Liu, and 
Trzcinka (35). 
31 For extended discussions of the relative dominance of FFO as a performance benchmark within REIT markets, 
see Gore and Stott (30), Vincent (40), Graham and Knight (31), Stunda and Typpo (39), and Ben‐Shahar, 
Sulganik, and Tsang (6). 
32 We thank Drew Winters, the editor, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions 
throughout the review process. In addition, we thank Nga Nguyen, Nga Trinh, and Kyle Allen for valuable 
research assistance. Any remaining errors are, as always, our own. 
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